Raza 事件のご紹介

0
    ニューヨーク市警はムスリムをムスリムであることのみを理由として大規模監視のターゲットとしていました。これに対しニュージャージーのムスリムらがニューヨーク市を提訴したのが先日ご紹介したHassan事件です。

    これとは別にニューヨークのムスリムらがニューヨーク市を提訴したのが今回ご紹介するRaza事件です。この事件は2013年に提訴されました。ニューヨーク市による訴え却下の申立てが棄却されて以来、証拠開示手続や和解交渉が続いていましたが、本日、2016年1月17日に正式に和解に至ったとのことです。

    支援をしていたACLU(アメリカ自由人権協会)によりますと、主な和解条項は3つです。https://www.aclu.org/blog/speak-freely/landmark-settlement-challenge-nypd-surveillance-new-york-muslims-what-you-need

    1 今後、宗教や人種に着目したプロファイリング捜査はしない。
    2 ニューヨーク市警の内部に民間の監督官を入れ、人権侵害的捜査に関してチェックさせる。
    3 差別的捜査の理論的支柱となった非科学的な論文をニューヨーク市警のウェブサイトから削除する。

    以上のように相当抜本的な和解内容となっており、関係者はいずれもlandmarkな妥結と評価しています。
    http://twitter.com/HinaShamsi/status/685147805699145728
    http://twitter.com/theCCR/status/685179227168239617


    日本におけるムスリム違法捜査は、ニューヨーク市警と連携してなされていたと思われます。本家のニューヨークで抜本的な見直しがなされる中、日本でのみ惰性的な差別的捜査が続くことは馬鹿げています。


    Hassan事件のご紹介

    0
      Hassan事件の連邦控訴審判決が出ました。
      https://ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-do/our-cases/hassan-v-city-new-york

      この事件は、ニューヨーク市警が本件における警視庁・警察庁と同じように、ムスリムであることのみを理由として大規模な監視・情報収集を行ったことの違憲性が争点です。
      一審では訴訟適格(Standing)を欠くとして訴えが却下され、原告らが控訴していました。

      連邦控訴審はStandingを認め一審判決を破棄しました。以下重要なポイントです。


      1 差別されること自体が損害だと認めた
      一審では監視されただけでは損害がないとされていましたが、宗教のみに着目して大規模な監視をすることは差別にあたり、差別は劣位的なレッテルやスティグマを張る点でそれ自体個人の尊厳を傷つけるから、独立した損害があると判断しています。

      2 差別の害意は関係がない
      一審は “the motive for the Program was not solely to discriminate against Muslims, but rather to find Muslim terrorists hiding among ordinary, law-abiding Muslims."として、市警の監視活動はムスリムコミュニティに潜むテロリストを見つけ出すことを目的とするものであり差別的な動機に基づくものではないため、平等保護条項に抵触しないとしていました(本件の一審判決とほとんど同じ言い回しです。)。

      控訴審はこの点について、意図と動機の違いを理解していないと厳しく批判し、差別的な動機がなくとも差別的な意図で行っていれば平等保護条項の侵害となりえるとしました。その上で、本件では差別的な意図があることは明らかであるから、司法審査が必要であると結論付けています。

      3 違憲審査基準は通常よりも厳しい基準が適用される
      平等保護条項に抵触する以上、当該捜査の目的と手段が適合しているかを審査しなければなりません。控訴審はその際の基準として、緩やかな合理性の基準を適用することは許されず、人種差別などに適用される厳格な審査基準か、女性差別などに適用される中間審査基準のいずれかが適用されるべきと判断しています。そのいずれを適用するかについては、差し戻し審の判断にゆだねています。

      合理性の基準よりも厳しい基準が適用される以上、ニューヨーク市はムスリムのみを監視することがテロ抑止に必要かつ相当であることを立証しなければなりません。これは抽象的な推測や憶測では足りず、具体的な証拠に基づくものでなければならないとされています。




      私たちはこれまで、ムスリムのみを狙い撃ちにする監視活動は差別的なものであって憲法上許されないと主張し、その裏づけとしてドイツの判例、イギリスの実例、自由権規約委員会・人種差別撤廃委員会の勧告などを提出してきました。国際的な潮流として、宗教に着目したプロファイリング捜査は禁止されつつありますが、本判決もこの流れに加わることとなります。


      流出資料によれば警視庁はアメリカの警察組織と連携して監視活動を行っています。文化的にも国際政治的にもムスリムに対する監視を日本が独自に始めたとは考えられず、アメリカの連携要請があったと考えるのが自然です。本家のアメリカでは違憲として中止されながら、分家のみが監視を継続するとなれば皮肉と言うほかありません。

      日本でだけムスリムの監視が許される特別な事情は皆無です。それにもかかわらず、国際的な流れを無視して最高裁が警視庁の捜査にお墨付きを与えるとなれば、「法の支配」を遵守する自由主義国家の一員という国際的な評価は失墜しかねません。

      最後にHassan事件の結論部分をご紹介します。

      ーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーー

      5 結論
      原告らの申立書における主張は、原告らにStandingがあることと、本件に解決されるべき憲法上の問題があることを物語っている。我々の職務は裁判である。「我々はただ法律だけを適用することができる。そして我々は憲法を遵守しなければならない。さもなくば我々は市民の裁判所であることをやめ、警察の施策遂行の1つの手段と成り下がるだろう」(Korematsu事件のジャクソン裁判官反対意見)

      我々は、このジャクソン裁判官の意見が歴史の正しい道を歩んでいること(略)を信じる。ある階級や集団に多数派を押し込めるときでさえー本件では世界の主要宗教の1つと関連付けられたーその行為は我々の憲法と十分に整合するものではない。「個々人の不忠の例を挙げることでその個人が属する集団の不忠とし、集団全体に対する差別的な取り扱いを正当化することは、個々人の有罪のみをその人の権利を剥奪する唯一の根拠とする我々の法制度を否定することだ」(同事件のマーフィー裁判官反対意見)

      本件で見かけ上起きていることは新しいものではない。我々はこれまでも同じような道を歩んできた。赤狩りの時代のユダヤ系アメリカ人、公民権運動の時代のアフリカ系アメリカ人、そして第二次大戦の時代の日系アメリカ人たちは、我々の中に着実に記憶されている。後になればはっきりと見て取れることをなぜ事前に予見することができないのか、ということに思い煩うかどうかは我々次第である。ー「忠誠は心や精神の問題であって、人種や信条や肌の色の問題ではない」(Ex parte Mitsuye Endo事件)。

      原判決を破棄し、当審の意見に即した更なる審理を尽くさせるため原審に差し戻す。

      ーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーー


      控訴審判決を受けて

      0

        2015415日、東京高裁717号法廷で控訴審判決の言い渡しがありました(東京高裁第24民事部:高野伸(裁判長)、田辺暁志、瀬戸口壮夫)。

        主文は、「双方の控訴を棄却する」というものです。

         

        個人情報の流出の責任はないとする東京都の主張は一審同様退けられました。

        他方で、ムスリムということのみを理由とした詳細な個人情報の収集は違法だとする原告らの主張も排斥されました。

         

        原告らは控訴審において新たに以下の証拠を提出していました。

         

        1 国連総会に提出された「テロ対策における人権及び基本的自由の促進及び保護に関する特別報告者による報告書」

        ムスリムということのみを理由としたプロファイリング捜査は、効果がないばかりでなく有害であるとする報告書

         

        2 自由権規約委員会の勧告

        本件捜査を対象としてなされた勧告。本件捜査に懸念を表しつつ、警察職員に対し、ムスリムへの広範な監視活動を含む人種的プロファイリングが許容されないことなどを日本政府に対し勧告するもの。

         

        3 人種差別撤廃委員会の勧告

        本件捜査を対象としてなされた勧告。本件捜査に懸念を表しつつ、民族的又は民族的宗教的集団に属することのみを理由とした個人のセキュリティ情報の体系的収集は重大な差別にあたること、警察が民族的又は民族的宗教的なプロファイリングを利用しないことを強く求めることを、日本政府に勧告するもの。

         

        また、原告の請求により、

        4 山本龍彦慶応大学教授の証人尋問

        も実施されました。

        山本教授は収集された情報がデータベース化されていることに着目。個別の情報を断片的、一次的に保有するものではなく、大量の個人情報を長期継続的に保有し、分析・利用することを予定する捜査は、民主的統制=個別の法律がなければ許されず、かつ、通常の情報収集活動よりも厳格な司法的統制に服するべきであることを証言しました。

         

        これらの証拠にもかかわらず、裁判所は、非常にあっさりとした記載で原告らの主張をいずれも排斥しました。

        判決の問題はいろいろありますが、個人的に最も違和感を抱いたのは次の一文です。

         

        「人権委員会及び人種差別撤廃委員会の報告に関する文書(注:各勧告)において、法執行機関関係者によるムスリムの監視に関してされた報告について懸念を表明する旨の記載があるが、これは、人権委員会及び人種差別撤廃委員会が、本件情報収集プログラム又は本件情報収集活動が自由権規約や人種差別撤廃条約に違反するとしているものとはいえない」

         

        人権委員会及び人種差別撤廃委員会は、「人種的プロファイリング」(規約委員会)、「民族的又は民族的宗教的なプロファイリング」(人種差別撤廃委員会)は、いずれも規約に違反するとして懸念を表明しています。人種差別撤廃委員会に至っては、重ねて、「民族的又は民族的宗教的集団に属することのみを理由とした個人のセキュリティ情報の体系的収集が重大な差別にあたる」と宣言し、そのようなプロファイリングをしないよう日本政府に勧告しています。

         

        控訴審のように、両委員会が本件情報収集プログラム・同情報収集活動について規約・条約違反としているわけではない、とするためには、本件情報収集プログラム・同情報収集活動が、「人種的プロファイリング」(規約委員会)、「民族的又は民族的宗教的なプロファイリング」・「民族的又は民族的宗教的集団に属することのみを理由とした個人のセキュリティ情報の体系的収集」(人種差別撤廃委員会)に当たらないと解するほかありません。

         

        しかし、原審は、「警察は,実態把握の対象とするか否かを,少なくとも第一次的にはイスラム教徒であるか否かという点に着目して決していると認められ」ると認定しています。控訴審もこの点を変更していません。

         

        そして、控訴審で原告らが提出した特別報告者による報告書では、「一次的にイスラム教徒であるか否かという点に着目した情報収集活動」は、典型的な人種的・民族的・宗教的なプロファイリングとされています。そうすると、本件情報収集プログラム・同情報収集活動は、「人種的プロファイリング」であり、「民族的又は民族的宗教的なプロファイリング」であり、「民族的又は民族的宗教的集団に属することのみを理由とした個人のセキュリティ情報の体系的収集」と解さざるを得ないように思えます。

         

        東京高裁の3人の裁判官たちが、どの点を捉えて、本件捜査がプロファイリング捜査に当たらないとしたのか、私には見当がつきません。裁判所は両委員会の勧告を無視したと評価するほかないように思えます。

         

        国際テロ対策は重要です。被害が生じる前の予防的捜査が肝心です。しかし、捜査をするに当たり、「一次的にイスラム教徒であるか否かという点に着目」することは許されません。それは、典型的な差別であり、人格権の侵害です。

        9.11以降、世界は一時的にパニックになりました。各国でムスリムか否かに着目したプロファイリング捜査が行われました。しかし現在では国際法に違反するとされています。ほとんどの国でそのような捜査は改められました。このような国際的に積み重ねられた知見を踏まえて、規約委員会と人種差別撤廃委員会は、2014年に、名指しで本件捜査が人権規約や人種差別撤廃条約に違反すると勧告しました。

         

        それにもかかわらず、警察のみならず司法までもがこれらの国際潮流を真正面から無視したのです。

         

        「『日本では、ムスリムというだけで詳細でセンシティブな個人情報を収集されます。モスクへの出入りを監視され、警察から尾行もされます。収集された情報はデータベース化され、警察が自由に利用します。しかもそのことは全く隠されていません。裁判所もお墨付きを与えています。けれどもムスリムの皆さん、どうぞ日本へお越しください、オリンピックを見に来てください』。日本政府からはそのように言われているように感じる。これはダブルスタンダードだし、ムスリムをバカにするものだ」。

         

        原告の一人は今回の判決を踏まえ、このように会見しました。世界には20億近くのムスリムがいるとされています。その人たちは同じように受け止めるでしょう。今回の判決によって、日本の人権感覚は国際常識と違うということを強烈に印象付けることとなってしまいました。

         

        誤った判決が最高裁で是正されるべく、弁護団は原告らと協議のうえ上告する方針です。

         


        控訴審判決(要旨)

        0
           2015年4月15日、東京高裁717号法廷で、本事件の控訴審判決がありました(東京高裁第24民事部:高野伸(裁判長)、田辺暁志、瀬戸口壮夫)。
           以下は判決要旨です。下線は裁判所により付されたものです。

          第1 主文

           1 1審原告ら及び1審被告東京都の控訴を棄却する。

           2 控訴費用は、1審原告らの各控訴に係るものは1審原告らの負担とし、1審被告東京都の各控訴に係るものは1審被告東京都の負担とする。


          第2 事案の概要

          (省略)


          第3 裁判所の判断の要旨

           ※本判決は、基本的に1審判決を引用しており、以下は、引用部分を含めた判決要旨である。アンダーラインは高裁判決で付加された部分の要旨である。

          1 争点1(警視庁及び警察庁による個人情報の収集、保管、利用についての国家賠償法上の違法性等)について

          (1)憲法20条1項(信教の自由)違反の主張について

           本件データの元となった各文書は、警視庁公安部外事第三課が保有していたものであり、本件データには「モスクの出入状況」等の1審原告らの個人情報が含まれている。

           本件の情報収集活動は、それ自体が1審原告らに対して信教を理由とする不利益な取扱いを強いたり、宗教的に何らかの強制、禁止、制限を加えたりするものではない。日本国内において国際テロが発生する危険が十分に存在するという状況、ひとたび国際テロが発生した場合の被害の重大さ、その秘匿性に伴う早期発見、発生防止の困難さに照らせば、本件モスク把握活動を含む本件の情報収集活動によってモスクに通う者の実態を把握することは警察法2条1項により犯罪の予防を始めとする公共の安全と秩序の維持を責務とされている警察にとって、国際テロの発生を未然に防止するために必要な活動というべきである。また、情報収集活動が、主としてイスラム教徒を対象とし、モスクの出入状況という宗教的側面にわたる事柄を含むことは、信仰内容それ自体の当否を問題視していることによるものではなく、イスラム教徒のうちのごく一部に存在するイスラム過激派によって国際テロが行われてきたことや宗教施設においてイスラム過激派による勧誘等が行われたことがあったという歴史的事実に着眼したもので、イスラム教徒の精神的・宗教的側面に容かいする意図によるものではない。他方、本件モスク把握活動は、外部から容易に認識することができる外的行為を記録したにとどまり、強制にわたるような行為はない。これらを総合すると、本件情報収集活動によって1審原告らの一部の信仰活動に影響を及ぼしたとしても、国際テロ防止のために必要やむを得ない措置であり、憲法20条、宗教法人法84条に違反しない。

          以上は、本件個人データ(本件データのうち、1審原告らの個人情報に関する部分)を収集した当時の状況を踏まえてのものであり、本件情報収集活動が、実際にテロ防止目的にどの程度有効であるかは、それを継続する限り検討しなければならず、同様な情報収集活動であれば、以後も常に許容されると解されてはならない。


          (2)憲法14条(法の下の平等)違反について

           警察は、実態把握の対象とする否かを、少なくとも第一次的にはイスラム教徒であるか否かという点に着目して決しており、この点で信教に着目した取扱いの区別をしていたものである。しかし、これは国際テロを巡るこれまでの歴史的事実に着眼してのものであり、イスラム教徒の精神的・宗教的側面に容かいする意図によるものではなく、本件情報収集活動は国際テロ防止のために必要な活動であり、他方、これによる原告らへの信教の自由に対する影響は、警察官がモスク付近ないしその内部に立ち入ることに不快感、嫌悪感を抱くといった事実上の影響が生じ得るにとどまることなどからすると、その取扱いの区別は、合理的な根拠を有するものであり、憲法14条1項に違反しない。

           1審原告らは、本件情報収集活動は、ムスリムがテロリストあるいはテロリストである可能性が高いという差別的なメッセージを発するもので、ムスリムに対する差別を助長すると主張するが、収集された情報が外部に開示されることを予定されていないことは明らかであり、本件情報収集活動が国家による差別的メッセージを発するものであるということはできない。


          (3)憲法13条違反(信仰内容・信仰活動に関する情報を収集・管理されない自由の侵害)について

           本件情報収集活動によって収集された1審原告らの情報は、社会生活の中で本人の承諾なくして開示されることが通常予定されていないものであるが、警察には、国際テロ防止のための情報収集活動の一環として、モスクに出入りする人について、その信仰活動を含む様々な社会的活動の状況を広汎かつ詳細に収集して分析することが求められ、他方で、モスクへの出入状況や宗教的儀式、教育活動への参加状況という外部から容易に認識することができる外形的行為は、第三者に認識されることが全く予定されていないわけではない。本件情報収集活動は国際テロの防止の観点から必要やむを得ない活動であるというべきであり、憲法13条に違反するということはできない。


          (4)警視庁及び警察庁による個人情報の保有等が憲法13条に違反するか

          情報通信技術の発展に伴い情報のデータベース化等が可能となり、捜査機関による個人情報の収集の局面のみならず、保管、利用の局面において憲法上の問題として検討する必要があるという見解は傾聴に値する。しかし、本件情報収集活動は、もともと継続的に情報を収集し、それを分析、利用することを目的とするものであり、このような情報の継続的収集、保管、分析、利用を一体のものみて、それによる個人の私生活上の自由への影響を前提として前記のとおり憲法適合性を判断したのであり、1審原告らの個人情報の保有等も憲法13条等に違反しない。

          また、1審原告らが指摘する最高裁平成20年3月6日第一小法廷判決(住基ネットの事案)は、住民基本台帳法に定める制度の仕組み等に即して判示したもので、本件とは事案を異にする。


          (5)当審における1審原告らの主張(国際人権規約違反)について

          市民的及び政治的権利に関する国際規約17条に定める個人の私生活上の自由の保護並びに同規約2条及び26条に定める宗教による差別的取扱の禁止は、その内容において憲法13条、14条1項において規定するところと異ならず、本件情報収集プログラム及び本件情報収集活動は同規約17条並びに2条及び26条に違反しない。


          (6)本件個人データの収集・保管・利用は、法律の留保原則、保護法、保護条例に違反しない。


          2 争点2(国家賠償法上の違法性)について

          (1)1審被告東京都について

           本件データは、警察職員(おそらくは警視庁の職員)によって外部記録媒体を用いて持ち出されたものと考えられる。

           警視総監は、本件データが外部へ持ち出されれば、個人に多大な被害を与えるおそれがあることが十分に予見可能であったから、1審原告らの個人情報が漏えいすることのないよう、徹底した漏えい対策を行うべき情報管理上の注意義務を負っていたところ、外事第三課内における管理体制は不十分なものであったとみざるを得ず、このことが、外部記録媒体を用いたデータの持出しにつながったものであるから、警視総監には、情報管理上の注意義務を怠った過失があり、1審被告東京都は国家賠償法による責任を負う。


          (2) 1審被告国について

           警察庁の監査責任者には本件流出事件について義務違反は認められず、1審被告国の責任を認めることはできない。


          (3)本件流出事件発生後の1審被告らの不作為の違法性について

          警視庁及び警察庁は、連携して、尽くすべき義務は尽くしたとみるのが相当であり、1審原告らのいう損害拡大防止義務を怠ったものということはできない


          3 争点3(損害)について

          本件流出事件が1審原告らに対して与えたプライバシー侵害及び名誉棄損の程度は甚大であり、1審被告東京都は、本件データが警視庁が保有していた情報であることを認めていないなどの事情を考慮し、1審原告らについては、一律に、各500万円(1審原告4については、その精神的損害は他の1審原告らよりは少ないことから200万円)をもって相当と認め、その1割を弁護士費用相当の損害と認める。

          以上



          控訴審の期日が決まりました

          0
              国と東京都を相手方とする国家賠償請求訴訟の控訴審(第二審)の期日が決まりました。当日は弁護団による控訴の趣旨の説明、憲法学者の証人尋問、被害者の証人尋問や意見陳述が行われる予定です。

                 本件に関しては、すでに自由権規約委員会と人種差別撤廃委員会により、各規約に違反する旨の懸念が表されています。また、憲法学者により、差別を助長することや警察の情報収集に歯止めがかからなくなることから異議が唱えられています。警察の情報収集活動に白地手形を与えた一審判決は、是正されるべきです。


            ■公安テロ情報流出被害国家賠償請求訴訟(一審被告:国、東京都)
             控訴審第一回口頭弁論期日
              2015年1月29日(木)14:00-
              東京高等裁判所第24民事部 第717号法廷(7階)

            ムスリムに対するプロファイリング捜査に関し、規約人権委員会から是正勧告が出されました

            0
               2014年7月24日、国連の規約人権委員会が、日本政府に対し、ムスリムに対するプロファイリング捜査をやめるよう、以下のような改善勧告を掲出しましたので、ご報告いたします(原典はこちらです。)。

              【原文】
              Surveillance of Muslims

              20.      The Committee is concerned about reports on widespread surveillance of Muslims by law enforcement officials (arts. 2, 17 and 26).

              The State party should:

                          (a)              Train law enforcement personnel on cultural awareness and the inadmissibility of racial profiling, including the widespread surveillance of Muslims by law enforcement officials;

                          (b)              Ensure that affected persons have access to effective remedies in cases of abuse. 


               
              【仮訳】

              ムスリムの監視 

              20.  委員会は、警察職員によるムスリムに対する広範な監視活動が報告されていることに、懸念を表明する(規約2条、17条及び26条)

              日本政府は、

              (a) 警察職員に対し、異文化の理解、及び、警察職員によるムスリムへの広範な監視活動を含む人種的プロファイリングが許容されないことについて、トレーニングを実施すべきである。

              (b) [権力が]濫用された場合には、影響を受けた人々に対する効果的な救済手段へのアクセスを確保すべきである。 


               規約人権委員会とは、いわゆる自由権規約(市民的及び政治的権利に関する国際規約)の実施を監督するために設置された国連の機関です。18名の専門家から構成される委員会が、条約締結国の規約実施状況を定期的に監査しています。今年、6年ぶりに日本が監査対象国となっていました。

               審査は7月15日、16日に行われ、多くのNGOがジュネーブ入りし、日本政府の規約違反行為を規約人権委員会に対し報告しました。
               ムスリム違法捜査弁護団も、同様に、委員会に対し、今回の流出資料を提出しつつ、警視庁・警察庁のムスリムに対する捜査が規約に違反することを指摘しました。
               事前のNGOとの公式セッションや、委員会本会議においては、複数の委員から本件捜査に関する質疑が発せられており、関心の高さがうかがわれました。 

               警視庁・警察庁による本件捜査は、偏見に基づく宗教差別であって、典型的な人権問題です。
               今回の勧告によって、最も普遍的な人権規定である人権規約に照らしても、本件捜査は当然に違法とされるべきであることが明らかになりました。
               控訴審においても規約委員会と同様の判断がなされるよう、引き続き注力します。



              規約人権委員会にカウンターレポートを提出しました

              0
                ムスリム違法捜査弁護団は、日本の警察による、在日のムスリムに対する網羅的で差別的な監視活動の問題点を指摘すべく、今年7月に予定されている、国連自由権規約委員会の日本審査に関し、カウンターレポートを提出いたしました。
                ダウンロードはこちらです。
                委員会の理事が本件に関心を抱き、日本政府に意見を求めることを期待しています。


                英訳5/5

                0
                   

                  3.           On Issue 3

                  (1)          

                  A)          The Incident was one in which the plaintiffs’ personal information was posted on the Internet. It included types of information that one least wishes to be disclosed to others, such as information on the plaintiffs’ faith and prior convictions. What is more, there was also data that took the form of a page noting relationships etc. with another Muslim individual under the heading “Suspicions”, and while these entries were confined to piecemeal information, it is difficult for a third party not to receive the impression that the plaintiffs are terrorists, supporters of such, or at least suspected by the police along those lines. Furthermore, once such information is leaked onto the Internet, due to their tendencies to diffuse and spread, there is the possibility that the information could extend to the entire world, and it is difficult to completely erase the information, and in reality, the Data had been downloaded onto more than 10,000 computers in more than 20 countries and regions as of 25 November 2010, less than one month since the Incident, as per (2) of the Undisputed Facts. In view of these points, it can only be said that the invasion of privacy and defamation that the Incident inflicted on the plaintiffs was of great magnitude.

                  Further, the plaintiffs have made testimonies such as the following: because of the leaked Data, their family may face discrimination, harm or disadvantages based on prejudice; their familial relations may be adversely affected; the mutual trust among Muslims was damaged; they were forced to become paranoid in everyday life and obsessed over people’s perceptions; it became difficult to work or secure permanent employment, or their businesses came to suffer; and that they no longer have a peace of mind in returning to their home countries, when considering the possibility of being suspected as a terrorist (1-17 of Exhibit A-34). The plaintiffs’ concerns are fully understandable in light of the above content and nature of the information contained in the Personal Data, and can be called characteristics of detriment from the invasion of privacy and defamation that the plaintiffs suffered.

                  B)          On the other hand, it must also be considered that with the exception of economic damage to some of the plaintiffs in the form of loss of employment and revenue etc., the above detriment to the plaintiffs have not yet materialised at this point, and remain vague insecurities about matters that may or may not eventuate in the future. On this point, the plaintiffs argue to the effect that some of the plaintiffs have: suffered bankruptcy in their business because despite directing capital and efforts toward establishing a foreign branch of the company they manage, their visa was denied due to the foreign authorities receiving notice of this false information regarding investigations, and the entire plan fell through; seen a drastic decrease of revenue at the restaurant they manage; effectively been fired from the restaurant they worked at; and lost their employment at an embassy. However, such matters differ greatly depending on the individual circumstances of each plaintiff, and it should be said that it is not proper to take into consideration such individual matters in calculating the amount of reparations.

                  C)          Incidentally, plaintiffs 1 and 4 were merely listed on others’ Résumé-like Pages as spouses, as found previously.  

                  However, although a profile photo of plaintiff 1 has not been leaked, he was listed on the “Familial Relations and Acquaintances” section of plaintiff 2’s Résumé-like Pages as her husband, along with his name, date of birth, address and employer, and the “Information on Suspicions” section of plaintiff 2’s Identity and Suspicions Page noted that he holds a lecturer-like position at the mosque and is highly reputable as an Islamic lecturer, and continuously participates in workshops, special prayers and sermons etc. held at the mosque, and that they passionately engage in missionary activities as a couple, as found in the above 1(1)B(b) and (d). As details of his religious activities have been leaked, and is entered under the “Information on Suspicions” section, depending on the reading of the leaked information, plaintiff 1 could, along with plaintiff 2, be mistakenly regarded as a terrorist supporter, and it should be said that it is not proper to differentiate his level of emotional suffering in comparison to the other plaintiffs.

                  In contrast, as for plaintiff 4, she is merely listed as plaintiff 3’s wife in the “Familial Relationships and Acquaintances” section of plaintiff 3’s Résumé-like Pages, with her name, date of birth and address noted, but not her employment. Also, on plaintiff 3’s Identity and Suspicions Page (29 of Exhibit A-1), she only has her name and date of birth noted as his wife, under the section of “Family” within “Identity Matters”. There is no mention of plaintiff 4 in the “Information on Suspicions” section. As a result, in relation to plaintiff 4, although the extent of her emotional suffering caused by the disclosure of information depicting her spouse as if he were a terrorist cannot be dismissed, there exists a substantial difference in the quality and quantity of her leaked personal information in comparison with the other plaintiffs, and it must be said that her emotional suffering is significantly less than the others.

                  D)          The defendant Tokyo metropolitan government has consistently declined to admit that the Data was information held by the Metropolitan Police Department, and this fact can be counted as one of the reasons why the plaintiffs were forced to go through the trouble of filing this lawsuit. Therefore, even on the premise that this in itself is not considered an independent illegality for the purposes of the State Compensation Act, it should be taken into account in calculating the reparations. The fact that revelations by the defendants on this point risks adverse effects on foreign relations is as held above in 2(3)B, but this does not justify burdening the plaintiffs in the previously stated ways.

                  (2)         Considering these matters comprehensively, it is held that 5 million yen each for each of the plaintiffs with the exception of plaintiff 4, and 2 million yen for plaintiff 4, is fair compensation for the plaintiffs’ emotional suffering caused by the defendant Tokyo metropolitan government’s breach of its duty of care in information management regarding this case. Additionally, in light of the substance of this suit, advancement of their claims through legal representation was necessary, so 10% of the reparations for each plaintiff (namely, 500,000 for each of the plaintiffs except for plaintiff 4, and 200,000 for plaintiff 4) should be held to amount to legal costs as damages within the scope of legal causation from the defendant Tokyo metropolitan government’s above breach in their duty of care.

                  As this case is a claim for uniform reparations, this Court initially considered adopting the minimum amount corresponding to plaintiff 4’s emotional suffering for all the plaintiffs, but because this would be too low for the others, separated out plaintiff 4, and as for the remaining plaintiffs, disregarded individual matters as previously stated, and translated their common detriment into a monetary amount in order to calculate a uniform sum of reparations.

                   

                  4.           On Issue 4

                  (translation omitted)

                   

                  IV.        Conclusion

                  Given the above circumstances, the plaintiffs’ claim against the defendant Tokyo metropolitan government has a basis to the following limit and is thereby granted: for each plaintiff with the exception of plaintiff 4, a sum of 5.5 million yen in damages as well as money accruing therefrom at an annual interest rate of 5% during a period starting from 26 July 2011 up to a date when the payment will be completed; and for plaintiff 4, a sum of 2.2 million yen in damages as well as money accruing therefrom at an annual interest rate of 5% during a period starting from 26 July 2011 up to a date when the payment will be completed. The remainder of their claim against the defendant Tokyo metropolitan government, as well as their claim against defendant Japanese government, are dismissed for a lack of basis. Accordingly, judgment is rendered as described in the main text.

                  A declaration for the suspension of provisional execution will not be made, as it is not proper. 



                  英訳4/5

                  0
                     

                    2.           On Issue 2

                    (1)         Illegality, for the purposes of the State Compensation Act, of the defendant Tokyo metropolitan government’s conduct regarding the Incident

                    A)          Firstly, although each of the reports made by the National Police Agency and the Metropolitan Police Department in December 2010 noted that the Data includes information with a high probability that they were handled by members of the police, it was not revealed specifically how the Data was removed to the outside. Police investigation into the course of the posting of the Data continued further, but the details have still not been made clear to this day, as in (4) of the Undisputed Facts.

                    To be sure, each of the documents that were the bases of the Data had been in the possession of the Third Foreign Affairs Division, as found in 1(1)A above. Also, as a result of wide-scope and intensive investigations conducted in an effort to solve the case, each of the reports mentioned earlier (Exhibits A-2, A-3) take note of revelations e.g. that some of the computers used in the Third Foreign Affairs Division lacked sufficient controls, including that of the history of external memory media usage, and that the fact that removal of the information using external memory media was possible cannot be denied. This description assumes that the Data was removed from the computers used in the Third Foreign Affairs Division using external memory media, without any mention of other possibilities such as hacks by outsiders, and there is no particular evidence suggesting such alternative scenarios.

                    In light of this, it is fair to regard the Data as having been removed using an external memory media by a member of the police (most likely a Metropolitan Police Department employee, considering the fact that according to Exhibit A-5, access to the exclusive folder that the Data was saved in was limited to the direct administrator and senior officers).

                    B)           

                    a)           Then, in considering the negligence of the Metropolitan Police Department in the Incident originating from such an act of removal, as the most newly created data in the Data is dated 1 January 2009 (Exhibits A-2, A-3), the Data can be regarded as having been removed to the outside world on or after the same month at the earliest, and, according to evidence (Exhibit A-23) and the totality of the pleadings, by this time, incidents of leaks from government agencies, including the police, had been happening frequently, including incidents involving the removal of data using external memory media, incidents involving the use of personal computers, incidents resulting in the posting of police information on the Internet, and incidents causing damage in the form of the disclosure of personal information as a result of leaks, as seen in Attachment 1, and it can be found that these leak cases had been reported in newspapers etc. Also, it is in the public knowledge that around that time, Winny was causing numerous leaks onto the Internet from computers other than that of the police and government agencies.

                    Further, the Data contained Personal Data which is the plaintiffs’ personal information, and particularly, the content included matters that directly relate to the inner world of individuals and the autonomy of personhood, in the form of information that not only directly revealed that the plaintiffs are Muslims but also indicated the strength of their faith, as well as criminal history, which directly relate to a person’s honour and reputation, as previously found and explained. It can be said that such information, even among the contents of personal privacy, amounts to information that one least wants others to know, and such information, once leaked onto the Internet, carries a risk of being communicated to the general public due to their high capacity to diffuse and spread, and it is extremely difficult, if not almost impossible, to later retrieve all of the information.

                    As a result, it can be said that it was sufficiently foreseeable to the Superintendent General that if the Data were removed and connected to an external computer, there was a danger of it being leaked onto the Internet through Winny etc., being communicated to the general public, and inflicting great damage to the plaintiffs.

                    Accordingly, the Superintendent General was under a duty of care in the area of information control to take thorough anti-leak measures so that the plaintiffs’ personal information would never be leaked.

                    b)           In response to this, the defendant Tokyo metropolitan government, citing a 1986 Supreme Court case, argues to the effect that clearly it cannot be said that the specific course of events leading to the Leak Incident, much less the outcome, namely, of the Data being posted on the Internet, was foreseeable to the Superintendent General, in light of the circumstances such as (i) Administrative Notices (On the Administration of Rules Regarding the MPD Information Security) prohibiting employees from removing electromagnetic memory media that constitute the police information system from the police buildings; (ii) the illegality of data removal, subject to criminal and disciplinary penalties as a violation of Article 34 of the Local Government Employee Act; (iii) the multiple acts required in the course of posting the Data on the Internet; and (iv) the complete absence of information leak cases through the removal of data after the February 2008 completion of the introduction of an automatic encryption system when recording data on external memory media from terminal devices (hereinafter referred to as the Automatic Encryption System).

                    However, penalty rules and administrative notices themselves do not make the removal of data impossible or difficult in a physical or technical sense, and as previously noted, there had already been numerous occasions of leaks from computers onto the Internet through Winny, by around January 2009. As for the Automatic Encryption System, there is insufficient evidence to hold that it had been installed on every computer used in the Third Foreign Affairs Division during the period between that month and the October 2010 date of the Incident. In fact, evidence (Exhibit A-5) shows that some computers used in the Third Foreign Affairs Division lacked the Automatic Encryption System. Accordingly, none of the points raised by the defendant Tokyo metropolitan government can be said to defeat the Superintendent General’s foreseeability illustrated above in subparagraph (b).

                    The defendant Tokyo metropolitan government also cites in its argument a 2005 Sapporo High Court case ((1) of Exhibit C-11) denying the foreseeability for the manager etc. in a information leak case, but this judgment can be distinguished from the present case due to the specific facts giving rise to foreseeability at the time of the incident. Therefore, consideration of this case does not influence the above decision.

                    C)          Next to consider is whether or not the Superintendent General breached his duty of care in information management.

                    a)           Evidence (Exhibits A-2, A-3, C-6, C-7) show that the Metropolitan Police Department established and published the “Rules Regarding Information Security of the MPD” (hereinafter referred to as the Security Rules) etc. on 28 June 2005. This (i) appointed a Metropolitan Police Department Information Security General Officer (hereinafter referred simply as the ‘General Officer’) to the Metropolitan Police Department headquarters, imposed with a duty to make efforts to appropriately maintain and manage computers, terminal devices, electronic communication lines or any connected machines, and electromagnetic memory media etc. (Article 10 of the Security Rules). Specifically, only authorised electromagnetic memory media could be used in police duties, in order to secure regular functioning of the police information system etc. and to prevent information leaks; Information Management Officers (whose duty involves information security relating to the police information system etc. in order to maintain the information security within their division) who accept into their division an electromagnetic memory media for the use of police duties were to receive an inspection by the head of their division at least once a month regarding its management; and Information Managers (whose duty involves the management of computers etc. in order to maintain information security relating to the police information system etc. within their post), if delivered an electromagnetic memory media by the Information Managing Officer, were to store it in a secure locker etc.; the handling of electromagnetic memory media was to be disclosed in a “Electromagnetic Memory Media Removal and Return Log” (7 (5) of the Administrative Notice No. 2 etc.). It also (ii) imposed an obligation on the General Manager to encrypt necessary information according to the objectives of the duty, in order to maintain information security (Article 11 of the Security Rules). Specifically, when storing information on an electromagnetic memory media, encryption measures were to be taken unless authorised by the General Manager, and the Information Manager was to verify trails of exports onto the electromagnetic memory media by the encryption file, and report the results to the head of the division (8(1) and (4) of the Administrative Notice No. 2). It further (iii) imposed an obligation on employees to properly handle the police information system etc. as well as the information processed by it (Article 14 of the Security Rules), specifically, prohibiting in general: transferring electromagnetic memory media to others, computers relating to personal ownership, bringing electromagnetic memory media etc. into the National Police Agency building, and removing devices and electromagnetic memory media comprising the police information system etc. from the National Police Agency building (11(3), (10), and (11) of the Administrative Notice No. 2).

                    b)           However, none of these measures made the removal of data from the building inherently impossible or difficult in a physical or technical sense, and it can be said that compliance with the above rules ultimately depended on the actions of each individual employee. What is more, in terms of the above (a)(i) and (ii), no evidence clarifies to what degree each of the procedures such as inspection of the management of electromagnetic memory media by the head of the division, entry into the “Electromagnetic Memory Media Removal and Return Log” of the removal and return of electromagnetic memory media, and the verification and reporting of trails of exports to electromagnetic memory media by encryption files, were practiced in reality.

                    As for the Automatic Encryption System, the fact that computers lacking its installment were being used at the Third Foreign Affairs Division was found above in B(b).

                    If so, as merely establishing and publishing security rules etc. and introducing an automatic encryption system does not ultimately serve as a conclusive factor in preventing information leaks to the outside, it should be said that constructing a management regime to ensure actual compliance of the Security Rules etc. by each employee or information manager etc. was necessary and essential as a genuine preventative measure.

                    c)           Yet it has been revealed that the management of trails of the history of external memory media usage etc. for some of the computers used in the Third Foreign Affairs Division was insufficient as held above in (a), and thus it must be observed that the management regime to ensure the actual compliance of security rules etc. in the Third Foreign Affairs Division was inadequate, and that this fact led to the removal of data using external memory media.

                    It must therefore be said that the Superintendent General negligently breached his duty of care in information management, which is illegal for the purposes of the State Compensation Act. As such, it follows that the defendant Tokyo metropolitan government is liable.

                    (2)         Illegality, for the purposes of the State Compensation Act, of the defendant Japanese government’s conduct regarding the Incident

                    A)          The plaintiffs allege to the effect that under Article 7 (1) of the Security Orders, The National Police Agency must designate an Inspection Officer to perform inspections relating to the police information system, and in light of duties that the role entails, as established by Article 7 (3), the Inspection Officer was under a duty of care, through opportunities such as regular inspections, to accurately assess the substance of the numerous information leak incidents between 2006 and 2008, analyse their causes and responses, reflect them in the Annual Information Security Inspection Plan, and secure, by the 2009 regular inspection of the Metropolitan Police Department at the latest, the implementation of measures to prevent information leaks using external memory media, and that breach of this duty resulted in the Incident.

                    B)          Upon consideration, it is true that the National Police Agency, under Article 7(1) of the Security Orders (Exhibit B-28), is to appoint an Inspection Officer to supervise the execution of inspections regarding information security related to the police information system, and according to the Execution Guidelines for Police Information Security Inspections (Exhibit B-30), the Inspection Officer, in conducting regular inspections of the prefectural police etc., is to formulate an Annual Information Security Inspection Plan, and based on this, establish an Inspection Execution Plan for each individual inspection; and after conclusion of the regular inspection, the Inspection Officer is to create a Inspection Report and submit it to the Chief Information Security Manager, who, based on the Report, instructs the heads of the divisions in question on necessary matters such as improvements to be made; the leaders receiving said instructions are to promptly take adequate measures based on the substance of the instructions, and report back to the Chief Information Security Manager on the outcome; and in addition, the Inspection Officer is to execute Special Inspections when the necessity of such is particularly recognised by the Chief Information Security Manager. The fact that the Incident was due to a breach of the duty of care in information management in the Third Foreign Affairs Division has already been elaborated on, and the possibility that the Incident might have been prevented had the inadequacies in information management been indicated at the National Police Agency’s inspection stage, cannot itself be denied.

                    However, inspections carried out by the National Police Agency’s Inspection Officer, besides the annual regular inspection, are special inspections responding to particular necessities, and are not of a kind involving, for instance, an Inspection Officer permanently stationed in each division to monitor compliance with information security (the National Police Agency is in a position to supervise the prefectural police in general, and it is impossible for Inspection Officers to be permanently stationed in each division of all the prefectural police forces in order to monitor compliance with information security, and it cannot be said that a duty to carry out such inspections exists), so cases in which the defendant Japanese government would be held liable for the Inspection Officer’s inspections should be said to be limited to cases, for example, such as a chronic failure to inspect, or a failure to articulate an inadequacy found through an inspection, and such circumstances cannot be found regarding the Incident, in compiling the totality of the evidence in this case.

                    On the other hand, evidence (Exhibit B-52) shows that the 2009 Police Information Security Inspection on the Metropolitan Police Department and the prefectural police etc., was carried out with a focus on improvements in response to indications from past inspections etc., the implementation of increasingly thorough preventative measures against the reoccurrence of information leaks, the implementation of information security measures concerning external memory media etc., the management of the police information system, and measures against breaches of information security. As a result, in some divisions inappropriate circumstances were identified such as (i) indications of the use of unauthorised external memory media on computers unable to acquire trails of their use; (ii) that encryption when recording information on external memory media was not thoroughly practiced; and (iii) verification of the trails of exporting information onto external memory media done by the very employees using the said media. Considering these findings, improvements were requested of the divisions in question to (i) reinforce the management and inspections etc. of the use of computers and external memory media; (ii) make thorough encryptions when recording information onto external memory media; (iii) have the manager of media usage verify trails in the import and export of information regarding external memory media; and to report the results to the administrative manager etc.

                    Further, according to evidence (Exhibit A-23) and the entirety of the pleadings, the National Police Agency implemented countermeasures for each of the following cases listed on Attachment 1: (i) In response to the leak of personal information onto the Internet at A and B police agencies in March 2006: measures such as the inspection of personal computers etc.; submission of confirmation documents (that no employee was to manage police information on personal computers or external memory media that is not authorised to use on duty, or use computers running Winny (both of which are held to standards at the time)); a reinforcement of information management based on remarks made by the Chief Cabinet Secretary at the meeting of administrative vice-ministers etc. held on the 9th of the same month, to the effect that information leaks through the use of personal computers were creating an extremely concerning situation, and that the relevant ministries and agencies were to reinforce warnings to each and every employee regarding computer use against information leaks; a sweep of personal computers used on duty; reinforcement of inspections; and special inspections against all of the prefectural police agencies etc., (ii) in response to the leak of personal information onto the internet from C police agency in February 2007: measures such as compliance with fundamental measures in information security including the implementation of self-inspections and individual interviews; compliance with rules regulating the management of police information; and limiting the use of external memory media as well as taking encryption measures etc., (iii) in response to the leak of personal information onto the Internet from D police agency in June of the same year: measures such as the reinforcement of fundamental matters regarding the management of police information; deleting of unnecessary police information; sweeping unauthorised personal devices; and inspecting personal computers etc., (iv) in response to the leak of police information onto the Internet from E police agency in May 2008: measures such as the inspection of personal computers and actual devices; prohibition on the use of unregistered external memory media; resubmission of confirmation documents; small group discussions etc. to raise awareness; recording and managing trails; and limiting the use of external memory media drives by USB keys.

                    Accordingly, it can be found that the National Police Agency’s Inspection Officer had been carrying out the necessary regular inspections and implementing possible measures every time an information leak onto the Internet happened.

                    C)          Therefore, the plaintiffs’ above argument cannot be accepted, and the defendant Japanese government cannot be found liable for the Incident.

                    (3)         Illegality, for the purposes of the State Compensation Act, of the defendants’ omissions following the Incident

                    A)          The plaintiffs allege to the effect that the Metropolitan Police Department is liable in state compensation because while it should have taken concrete measures such as promptly acknowledging the Data as documents created and managed by the Metropolitan Police Department and the National Police Agency, and making requests against Internet providers etc. continuing to publish and post the material to delete them, in reality the Metropolitan Police Department and the National Police Agency refused to acknowledge that they had created and managed the documents in the Data, and failed to take effective measures until admitting to the leak and making a formal apology on 24 December 2010.

                    B)          Upon consideration, certainly, according to the pleadings in their entirety, the Metropolitan Police Department and the National Police Agency could not have comprehensively deleted the Data including the plaintiffs’ personal information.

                    However, evidence (Exhibits A-2, A-3) show that the National Police Agency recognised the Incident on 29 October of that year, contacted the Metropolitan Police Department, and in cooperation, commenced investigations etc. At the same time, it can be found that the Metropolitan Police Department immediately requested cooperation, to delete the Data, from providers etc. that offered spaces for webpages posting them.

                    Also, despite the fact that completely deleting the Data, which included the plaintiffs’ personal information, was not ultimately possible as above, according to the totality of the pleadings, the reason for this was a combination of multiple factors such as that in this Incident, methods were used to inhibit identification of the leak source such as transiting through numerous overseas servers; that due to Winny, the file sharing software used, retrieval of the information was virtually impossible; and that the police could not compel erasure of the Data from the servers onto which the leaked information was posted, merely making requests against overseas servers to voluntarily delete them.

                    Consequently, it is fair to say that the Metropolitan Police Department and the National Police Agency, in cooperation, fulfilled their duty as they should, and cannot be said to have failed in their duty to mitigate loss as the plaintiffs claim.

                    While this Court notes the fact that the defendants have not acknowledged that the Data consists of documents created and managed by the police even in this lawsuit, evidence (11(1)-(114) of Exhibit A-1) and the totality of the pleadings demonstrate that the Data contains information regarding individuals or organisations, information about cooperation with foreign countries, as well as information-gathering activities by the police etc., and it can be found that a straightforward admission that the Data had been created and managed by the police involves the risk of further harming the rights and interests of those individuals and organisations, as well as damaging the trust of the countries in question and impeding the appropriate execution of information-gathering activities etc. regarding future police strategies against international terrorism. Thus, it cannot be said that this itself is an act that is independently illegal for the purposes of the State Compensation Act.

                    C)          Therefore, the above arguments of the plaintiffs cannot be accepted.

                     


                    英訳3/5

                    0
                       

                      (3)         On whether the Information Gathering Activities violate Article 14 of the Constitution

                      A)          The plaintiffs allege that the Information Gathering Activities target Muslims by exclusively directing attention to their religious affiliation, and thereby constitute discrimination based on “creed” that is prohibited by the second sentence in Article 14 Clause 1 of the Constitution.

                      a)           To be sure, of the Data, the document titled “Outline for Reinforcing Reality Assessments” (1 of Exhibit A-1) states that “Muslims with nationalities of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) countries and others” are “Targets of Reality Assessments”, and accordingly, it can be held that the police, at least at the preliminary stage, determined subjects of the reality assessment by directing attention to whether or not they were Muslims. Therefore, the fact that they had made a distinction in treatment by focusing on faith on this point cannot itself be denied.

                      Further, as Article 14(1)of the Constitution is interpreted as prohibiting discriminatory treatment unless there are reasonable grounds corresponding to the nature of the matter (Supreme Court 27 May 1964 Grand Bench, Civil Cases in the Supreme Court, Volume 18, Issue 4, Page 676 ; Supreme Court 4 April 1973 Grand Bench, Criminal Cases in the Supreme Court, Vol. 27, Issue 3, Page 265 et alibi.) As the second sentence explicitly disallows discrimination by reason of “creed”, and in view of the importance of religious freedom as one of the spiritual freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, it is necessary to examine closely whether or not there is reasonable cause for separate treatment on the basis of religion.

                      b)           Upon analysis, (i)the Information Gathering Activities primarily targeted Muslims and collected information touching on the comings and goings at mosques, a matter with a religious aspect, not by taking issue with Muslims’ faith itself, but instead by directing attention to the historic realities of international terrorism, and with the intention of preventing harm to the general public by detecting and guarding against international terrorism by radical Muslims, as opposed to meddling in the spiritual and religious aspects of Muslims; (ii)assessing the plaintiffs’ religious activities etc. including circumstances of their mosque attendance through the Information Gathering Activities was a necessary activity for the prevention of international terrorism belonging within police duties; and (iii)what effect this had upon religious liberties of the plaintiffs, if any, remained within the realm of repulsion against the presence of police officers in and around the mosques, as elaborated in the above (2)B(e).

                      c)           It then follows that even considering that distinctions were made in this case based on creed as explicitly listed in the second sentence of Article 14(1) of the Constitution, and the weight that freedom of religion carries as one of the freedoms of spirit, the different treatment had reasonable cause, and did not violate the clause in question.

                      B)          The plaintiffs allege that despite Article 14 of the Constitution guaranteeing the right not to be discriminated against, and the State owing a duty not to promote discrimination when engaging in conduct with the effect of promoting discrimination, the Information Gathering Activities were based on prejudice that Muslims are terrorists or have a high possibility of being one, and amounted to the State conveying a discriminatory message, thereby having the effect of promoting discrimination against Muslims, and violating the plaintiffs’ right not to be discriminated against.

                      However, as the distinctive treatment in the Information Gathering Activities has reasonable grounds as explained in above A, and as it is clear from the format etc. that the information collected by the said activities was not expected to be disclosed to the outside world, it cannot be said that the Information Gathering Activities in themselves give off a discriminatory message on part of the State.

                      On this point, the plaintiffs allege that even if it remains information collected and stored by the police, the danger of leaks is omnipresent, and once a leak does take place, it sends a strong message to the public that the police treat Muslims in a discriminatory matter. Yet this points back to the illegality of allowing the leak, and cannot form a basis for the unconstitutionality or illegality of the Information Gathering Activities as strictly construed.

                      Further, the plaintiffs allege that in light of Articles 13 and 14 of the Constitution, the plaintiffs have a legal interest in not being treated in a discriminatory manner by the State, which was violated by the Information Gathering Activities, but this line of argument cannot be accepted in light of the above explanations.

                      Therefore, the plaintiffs’ above arguments cannot be accepted.

                      (4)         On whether or not the Information Gathering Activities violate the freedom of not having information regarding the content or activities of one’s faith collected and managed by government institutions without just reason (Article 13 of the Constitution)

                      A)           

                      a)           That some plaintiffs had their access to mosques or participation, if any, in religious ceremonies and educational activities noted in their Résumé-like Pages, or their missionary passion specifically noted in the “Suspicions” section of the Identification and Suspicions Pages, were found in above (1)B. Not only do these entries suggest that they are Muslims; they go further by indicating the strength of their convictions. Whatever thoughts or beliefs that a person holds are matters that directly affect an individual’s interior world and personal autonomy, and is a type of information that is ordinarily unexpected to be disclosed without consent in social life.

                      b)           However, that the prior prevention of international terrorism necessitates assessment of the realities surrounding mosque attendees, and the fact that this can only be achieved in the form of continuous assessment, to a certain degree, of their activities through a presence not only around but at times inside mosques, was explained in above (2)B(d) and (e). Furthermore, as suspicions have arisen that Lionel Dumont, who was arrested in Germany in December 2003, had been obtaining financing for terrorist acts and engaging in the procurement of supporters while taking cover in Japan under a counterfeit passport as recognised in above (2)B(c), and as the United Nations adopted an international treaty in 1999 regarding the prevention of financial assistance for terrorism, and in light of facts such as that on 22 October 2004, the FATF (Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering) delivered a special recommendation regarding terrorist financing, providing a nine-point fundamental framework for the detection, prevention and deterrence of terrorism and financial provisions thereof, upon the understanding that actions against financial supplies for terrorism are crucially important ((1) and (2) of Exhibit B-8), it can be said that surveying mosque attendees for terrorist supporters, such as funders of terrorism, is an information-gathering activity necessary for the prevention of international terrorism incidents. If so, it ought to be said that the police, who are under the obligation of maintaining public safety and order under Article 2 (1) of the Police Act, are required to probe and analyse the current state of social affairs, including religious activities, for each person accessing mosques, as a part of information-gathering attempts for the prevention of international terrorism.

                      At the same time, the Mosque Monitoring Activities took the form of agents themselves going to mosques and observing external conduct readily recognisable from the outside, such as the plaintiffs’ comings and goings at mosques and circumstances of their participation in religious ceremonies and educational activities. In this sense, it cannot be said that the plaintiffs’ behaviour thus assessed was not at all expected to be recognised by a third party, and even considered in the totality of the Information Gathering Activities, these did not demand the plaintiffs to prove their faith, nor did it impose prejudicial treatment or any coercion, impediments or restrictions in religious terms, their possible effects confined to the plaintiffs’ sentiments of repulsion triggered by police presence around or inside mosques.

                      On this point, the plaintiffs allege that plaintiffs 5 and 16 were subjected to illegal searches and seizures that deviate from and abuse the rules of criminal procedure, in relation to a case with a third party suspect. Indeed, according to the facts (11(4) and 1(4) of Exhibit A-1), it can be found that searches and seizures of mobile phones etc. were conducted against plaintiffs 5 and 16. However, there is insufficient proof that these searches and seizures were illegal, so the plaintiffs’ arguments cannot therefore be accepted.

                      Additionally, in light of the gravity of the damage once an incident of international terrorism occurs, even considering that the plaintiffs’ information gathered through the Information Gathering Activities would not ordinarily be expected to be disclosed without their consent in social life, it should be said that the Information Gathering Activities were necessary and inevitable from the point of view of preventing international terrorism.

                      c)           Therefore, the plaintiffs’ submission that the Information Gathering Activities violated Article 13 of the Constitution cannot be accepted.

                      B)          The plaintiffs further allege that the Data contains information of the plaintiffs’ nationalities, domicile, criminal history etc., which can be grounds for social discrimination, and thus amounting to sensitive information. Accordingly, they can be understood to be arguing to the effect that the collection of information other than those relating to the substance and activities of their faith also violate the freedom of not having their personal information collected and managed without reason. It can certainly be said that these information amount to the plaintiffs’ privacy, with criminal history particularly relevant to a person’s honor and reputation.

                      However, in light of the fact that there is sufficient danger of international terrorism happening in Japan, and the difficulties in its prevention through obtaining information regarding terrorist plots, or detecting terrorists concealing themselves amongst the general public, the Information Gathering Activities are necessary to prevent the occurrence of international terrorist attacks in advance and requires the compilation of various information, as explained above in (2)B. Consequently, even if the plaintiffs had not only information of the substance and activities of their faith but also information regarding their privacy including criminal records etc. collected through the process of the said activities, such constraints are inevitable in light of the above nature etc. of the Information Gathering Activities. What is more, as for the manner of the profiling, it can be conjectured, as elaborated in above (1)C, that the information was collected through cooperation with related agencies or police contact and searches etc. on the plaintiffs, which cannot be called illegal or particularly inappropriate. Hence, the Information Gathering Activities cannot be said to violate Article 13 of the Constitution.

                      (5)         On whether the retention of personal information by the Metropolitan Police Department and the National Police Agency violate Article 13 of the Constitution

                      A)          The plaintiffs allege to the effect that the retention of the plaintiffs’ personal information, by entry into the police database, itself violates the right not to have information related to an individual disclosed or released to a third party unreasonably, as guaranteed by Article 13 of the Constitution.

                      However, information-gathering activities are conducted in order to store and analyse the information thus obtained, and it has been previously established that the Information Gathering Activities do not violate Articles 13 and 20 of the Constitution. Because it naturally follows that the police may keep and use for analysis etc., information obtained through legal activities, the possession of said information does not violate Article 13 of the Constitution.

                      B)          On this point, the plaintiffs allege, among other things, the existence of a specific danger of disclosure or release of personal information to third parties in the event of flaws in the system technology or legal regime of an information management mechanism, citing a 2008 Supreme Court case, and points out that this very case came to light by such a leak, in other words, as a result of the risk of information being readily leaked actually materialising.

                      However, this allegation merely argues the illegality not of the police’s possession of the plaintiffs’ personal information in itself, but the fact that the information was disclosed or released to third parties: namely, the occurrence of the Incident. Moreover, although the 2008 Supreme Court case, in considering whether or not the Basic Residential Registers Network System violated the freedom of not having information relating to an individual disclosed or released to third parties unreasonably, assessed, inter alia, the specific dangers, if any, of information leaks due to breaches etc. in the mechanics of the System, this derived from the fact that the substance of the claim in said suit focused on a deletion of the resident’s card code based on the removal of an impediment against the right to personhood, distinguishable from the present case regarding a claim for State compensation on the premise that a leak has actually happened, and therefore it cannot be appropriately applied to this case.

                      C)          Therefore, the plaintiffs’ argument cannot be accepted.

                      (6)         On whether or not there is a violation of the due process principle

                      The plaintiffs argue that the continuous, systematic, comprehensive, and large-scale collection, storage and use of personal information as in the Information Gathering Activities require a law that explicitly states specific objectives and standards to be met, and that Article 2 (1) of the Police Act does not serve as such a basis.

                      However, in light of the fact that Article 2 (1) of the Police Act designates the “prevention of crime” and “otherwise maintaining public safety and order” as police duties, the various police activities these necessitate should generally be tolerated as long as they are voluntary measures without compulsion, and it has already been established that the Information Gathering Activities are necessary activities in light of the above duties.

                      When the information to be collected relate to matters that risk interference with people’s rights and freedoms, activities for the collection of such information should not be permitted unconditionally. However, the Information Gathering Activities are necessary and inevitable from the viewpoint of preventing international terrorism, as also previously explained.

                      Therefore, the plaintiffs’ above argument cannot be accepted.

                      (7)         On whether or not the gathering, retention and usage of the Personal Data violate the Act on the Protection of Personal Information

                      (translation omitted)

                      (8)         On whether or not the gathering, retention and usage of the Personal Data violate the Local Ordinance on the Protection of Personal Information

                      (translation omitted)

                      (9)         Summary

                      Consequently, as no part of the collection, storage or use of personal information by the Metropolitan Police Department and the National Police Agency can be found unconstitutional or illegal, no illegality can be found for the purposes of the State Compensation Act.

                       

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